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ABSTRACT
This article explores how irrigation management transfer policies
were implemented in Mali, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. In
Mali and Mozambique, where the irrigation bureaucracy controlled
one large irrigation system, state agencies retained control over
irrigation management despite reduced state funding. In Malawi
and Zimbabwe, where the state irrigation systems and the irrigation
bureaucracy were smaller, users have taken over irrigation manage-
ment, but are having trouble sustaining irrigated agriculture. We
show how irrigation management transfer policies were shaped by
the interplay between international donors, macro-economic
dynamics, national politics and the interactions with (and the nat-
ure of) irrigation infrastructure, bureaucracies and organized users.
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Since the 1980s irrigation reforms have been implemented across the globe. Initially these
reforms were inspired by the broader set of ‘participatory approaches’ to development
that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Cernea, 1985; Cleaver, 1999) and were
labelled ‘participatory irrigation management’ and ‘participatory irrigation development’
(Groenfeldt & Svendsen, 2000). These policies aimed at increasing the participation of
water users to empower them to become actively engaged in decision making and to
increase responsibility, accountability, transparency and the power of water users to
deﬁne how ‘their’ irrigation systems are managed (Coward & Uphoﬀ, 1986) to improve
agricultural production. Some of these ideas were picked up, merged and hybridized with
the broader liberalizing economic reforms that were promoted by international organi-
zations in the 1980s and 1990s. In water and irrigation management these reforms
emphasized decentralization, through the transfer of operation and maintenance respon-
sibilities from national public entities to lower levels of government and organized water
users (Johnson, 1997; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014), and marketization, through the
privatization of services. This has generally been called irrigation management transfer
(IMT). How participatory irrigation management, participatory irrigation development
and IMT were named and introduced varies greatly between countries. In most cases it
led to the establishment of water user associations (WUAs), which were responsible for
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tasks associated with irrigation management at diﬀerent levels (Wegerich, 2008). WUAs
were to become ﬁnancially self-suﬃcient through collecting fees from users. User parti-
cipation, increased fee recovery, cost reduction and better performance in operation and
maintenance (O&M) have frequently been cited as the beneﬁts of these programmes
(Vermillion & Garces-Restrepo, 1994). However, Senanayake, Mukherji, and Giordano
(2015) show, in an extensive literature review, that ‘normative’ evaluations of the
performance and eﬀects of these interventions around the globe present little convincing
evidence of improved performance. The underlying linear development model in which
the WUA functions as a one-model-ﬁts-all policy recipe indicates belief in social engi-
neering (Merrey & Cook, 2012; Venot, 2014).
Critical studies of the implementation of IMT programmes show that these pro-
grammes had diﬀerent objectives and implementation trajectories, moulded by a variety
of actors with intentions that stretched beyond those that were made explicit (Rap &
Wester, 2013; Suhardiman, Giordano, Rap, & Wegerich, 2014; Veldwisch & Mollinga,
2013). Several of these studies were conducted in Asia and Latin America, where state
agencies had played an important role in large-scale irrigation development and manage-
ment. In sub-Saharan Africa large-scale state-led irrigation development was never so
important as in Asia and Latin America, and farmer-led irrigation development (by
private investors and local communities) has not attracted much policy and academic
interest until very recently (Woodhouse et al., 2017). Studies on irrigation management
in sub-Saharan Africa have mostly focussed on the process of formation of local institu-
tions, for instance using a critical institutionalism framework, and tend to show that
these were amalgams of new and pre-existing organizations (Cleaver, 2000; Cleaver & De
Koning, 2015; Venot, 2014). Yet, relatively little is known about the policy processes,
politics and ideologies underlying their introduction. This is pertinent in a context where
African governments are looking to greatly expand irrigated areas and where the state–
irrigator (user) relation is under increasing pressure (Veldwisch, Venot, Woodhouse,
Komakech, & Brockington, 2019).
The literature suggests that the size and technology of irrigation systems interact with
the dynamics of national irrigation policies (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004; Mollinga &
Veldwisch, 2016). This led us to select a range of contrasting countries in terms of the
size and distribution of irrigation infrastructure. Mali and Mozambique each have one
large-scale irrigation system which is central to national irrigation policies. Zimbabwe
and Malawi are characterized by more dispersed, small-to-medium irrigation schemes
with mixed histories of public and communal management. In this article we pose and
address the question of how internationally advocated IMT policies were implemented
across diﬀerent scales in these four countries and what can we learn from the diﬀerences
between them.
We approach this question through a comparative analysis of how IMT was shaped
through interplay at three interconnected scales in the four selected countries.
Speciﬁcally, we look at the interactions between international donors, macro-economic
dynamics, national policy making and the interactions with (and the nature of) irrigation
bureaucracies and organized users. We do so by adopting the notion of policy as a
contested process that is shaped by the interactions between actors who operate in
various institutions with diﬀerent spatial reaches – local, regional, national and interna-
tional (Hoogesteger, Tiaguaro-Rea, Rap, & Hidalgo, 2017). The analysis is based on a
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review of English-language literature (published and grey) on IMT in sub-Saharan
countries derived from searches of academic literature databases and focused on identi-
fying descriptions and analyses of the policy processes associated with IMT.1
Our analysis highlights the contested nature and contextual speciﬁcities of the pro-
cesses of policy implementation. It shows how internationally promoted policies, such as
IMT, change form and meaning according to the context in which they are implemented,
which, in turn, results from the interplay between international donor push, macro-
economic dynamics, national politics and related policy making, and the interactions
with (and the nature of) irrigation infrastructure, bureaucracies and organized users. The
article thus makes a critical contribution to understanding how IMT processes have been
implemented across sub-Saharan Africa, their attractiveness to certain actors and the
diﬃculties experienced by others.
The next section provides a background on IMT processes and their histories from a
global perspective, both empirically and how they have been studied. We then present
our framework of analysis for the four case study countries, which are given in full in the
next section. We conclude with a synthesis of the cases and propose an agenda to further
study policy processes in the irrigation sector and speciﬁcally the aftermath of IMT.
The history of IMT
Worldwide participatory irrigation management and participatory irrigation develop-
ment approaches to irrigation management (mostly implemented in Asia since the late
1970s and early 1980s) pioneered and set the basis for the broad World Bank–ﬁnanced
IMT programmes of the 1990s. These programmes combined elements of participatory
irrigation management and participatory irrigation development with broader ideas
about economic liberalization, administrative decentralization and the privatization of
services which still continue to characterize internationally advocated, liberally inspired
sectoral reforms in the water and irrigation sector (Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014).
Concerns about ineﬃcient, and for the state expensive, irrigation management resulting
from poor performance by government agencies provided fertile ground for the inter-
national promotion of reforms that rest on the principles of decentralization and the
transfer of irrigation management responsibilities to farmer/user-based associations
(Vermillion, 1994; Wegerich, 2008). International donor agencies such as the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the US
Agency for International Development (among others) which have a long history of
involvement in irrigation development going back to the 1960s, played an important role
in promoting, funding and supporting these irrigation-sector reforms (Mollinga &
Bolding, 2004; Rap, 2006; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014; Suhardiman & Mollinga,
2012). In broad terms these reforms aimed to rationalize public expenditure and ‘mod-
ernize’ the institutions in the irrigation sector and to promote the sustainable participa-
tion of the private sector to improve the performance and productivity of public
irrigation systems. This was to be facilitated through the development of appropriate
regulatory and administrative frameworks and the creation and strengthening of WUAs.
IMT programmes were central policy instruments in contributing to this and com-
monly included transferring the tasks of administration and O&M to ﬁnancially auton-
omous WUAs. The expected outcomes were reduced state expenditure on the
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management of state irrigation systems, better water delivery services through making
water users responsible for irrigation management, better ﬁnancial, managerial and
administrative accountability, and fee recovery. Central aspects of these changes were
the introduction of irrigation service fees, which would provide the ﬁnancial basis for the
WUAs’ functioning (Johnson, 1995), and the introduction of democratic regulations for
decision making within WUAs. While these international policies were often based on
the same blueprints, there are great diﬀerences in how the policies were implemented and
played out in diﬀerent countries (Suhardiman et al., 2014; Veldwisch & Mollinga, 2013).
In a period in which IMT was becoming a globally lauded policy recipe Shah, Van
Koppen, de Lange, and Samad (2002) had already warned that what had seemingly
worked well in Mexico, Turkey and New Zealand could not be simply transferred to
sub-Saharan countries. They noted that smallholder farmers in public irrigation systems
were seriously constrained by their limited ‘wealth-creating potential’, low levels of
commercialization and poor access to both inputs and technical support. They also
argued that the scatteredness and small size of irrigation in many sub-Saharan countries
posed an additional hindrance to IMT. There is no available overview of where, when and
how IMT processes were implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, or their outcomes. Many
countries do not explicitly name the process, in others the process has simply not been
studied, and in yet others the transfer of management is a de facto result of state absence
in light of under-resourced irrigation departments.
‘Normative’ outcome evaluations have assessed IMT policies on the basis of their
eﬀects on a variety of performance indicators. These include both qualitative and
quantitative eﬀects on crop production, users participation, the quality of the O&M of
irrigation systems, the reliability and adequacy of water distribution, fee collection rates,
the ﬁnancial viability of WUAs, reduction of conﬂicts, impacts on users’ livelihoods, and
government spending (Bell et al., 2013; Senanayake et al., 2015). The study by Senanayake
et al. (2015) is the most comprehensive and rigorous attempt in this direction. It
identiﬁed over 1500 documents relating to IMT policies, of which 131 were selected
for detailed scrutiny, based on criteria linked to their research questions. These jointly
reported on 230 cases. The study included an analysis of the criteria used to evaluate
performance outcomes and the direction of the impacts (negative/negligible or positive).
Few discernible trends in impacts were observed; and in general there was nearly a
balance between negative and positive eﬀects. In 95% of the 40 cases for which data were
available a decrease in government spending (a positive result) was reported, yet for 190
cases no result was reported. In only 15 (about 7%) of the 230 cases was evidence found
that ‘possess[ed] the minimum degree of methodological rigor to draw conclusions about
impact’ (p. 177). Thus, despite the extensive literature evaluating IMT, it turned out to be
diﬃcult to prove ‘success’ on the basis of such performance outcomes. This is due to both
the lack of rigour in the evidence and the very contradictory outcomes in terms of most of
the reported criteria.
Critical studies of IMT point to the fact that where the success of performance
(improvement) has remained sketchy, the ‘performance of success’ has clearly played
an important role in spreading the policy recipe across the globe (Rap, 2006). That is, an
image of success was created to advance the interests of certain key actors in the policy
process. The study by Rap (2006) is one example of several more critical in-depth case
studies on the process of IMT implementation in some countries in Latin America and
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Asia. Another study (Rap &Wester, 2013) shows how in the early 1990s speciﬁc actors in
the Mexican bureaucracy used the internationally funded water reforms, which included
an ambitious IMT programme, to re-establish an independent national water manage-
ment institute, while at the local level IMT was implemented through strategic alliances
between large commercial producers and local elites who had direct stakes in controlling
the newly created WUAs. Hoogesteger et al. (2017) show that in Ecuador the creation of
alliances between the top of the national government, the Ministry of Agriculture and the
World Bank enabled a radical decentralization of the hydraulic bureaucracy. In turn, the
implementation of the ‘successful’ Ecuadorian IMT programme and its outcomes greatly
relied on how water users engaged in cooperating or resisting the IMT programme at the
local level (see also Hoogesteger, 2013, 2015). Oorthuizen (2003) shows, in detail, how
conﬂicts of interest between local, sub-national and national levels of the National
Irrigation Administration in the Philippines stalled the reform eﬀorts of the IMT
programme. In Indonesia Suhardiman et al. (2014) show ‘the important role played by
international donors in facilitating reform processes and the irrigation bureaucracy’s
power to resist donor-driven policy reform agenda’ (p. 452), which led to waves of
decentralization and recentralization. Veldwisch and Mollinga (2013) found similar
processes at play in Uzbekistan and argue that the authoritarian post-Soviet state used
the IMT process to reorganize its control over agricultural production. This analysis
shows that IMT can be a strongly state-centric process that leaves little room for local
experimentation. In such circumstances the desire of national bureaucracies to imple-
ment IMT has very little to do with increasing user participation or fostering autono-
mous governance. What these studies show is that negotiations between actors active in
the water and irrigation sectors at diﬀerent scales shaped the nature of IMT policy
implementation.
Policy making across scales
In our analysis we regard policy making as an intrinsically negotiated multi-scalar
process and a contested political process. This by deﬁnition means that it is open-
ended and dynamic. This contrasts with more linear (or cyclical) understandings of
policy formulation and implementation often used by political scientists. Grindle and
Thomas (1989) critique linear models for taking the policy decision as the critical choice,
after which implementation automatically follows. Thomas and Grindle (1990) argue
that to understand policy making and implementation processes it is necessary to focus
on the societal conﬂicts and responses that a (proposed) policy produces. They also point
to the importance of analyzing the resources policy makers need to mobilize to deal with
these responses, such as interactive and ongoing negotiations (Grindle & Thomas, 1989;
Rap, 2006). As a result, policies are actually ‘made’ during implementation, rendering
them mutable and dynamic (see also Rap & Wester, 2013).
In our analysis we also pay attention to the notion of spatial scale. In human
geography the concept of scale is used for ‘understanding the processes that shape and
constitute social practices at diﬀerent levels of analysis’ (Marston, 2000, p. 220). This can
provide a better understanding of how spatial scale, as expressed through the diﬀerent,
apparently ﬁxed, nested series of institutional levels (local water users, regional irrigation
agencies, the national government and international donor agencies) matters for policy
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processes. As a result we conceive the sectoral reform of IMT as political projects that aim
to transform, and are in themselves transformed by, existing practices and their related
legal and institutional frameworks at diﬀerent interrelated scales (Hoogesteger et al.,
2017). In doing so we link broader (inter)national socio-economic and political processes
and their dynamics to more speciﬁc sectoral processes that occur at diﬀerent scales. We
seek to explain how the inter-relations between actors involved in the IMT process are
inﬂuenced by, and tied to, broader socio-economic and political processes and the
mobilization of resource ﬂows.
Based on these notions we pose that the policy process of IMT is shaped by both top-
down policy implementation and the bottom-up responses these policies create within
institutions, at the diﬀerent scales with a concern in irrigation management – water
bureaucracies, irrigation agencies, WUAs and local communities (Hoogesteger et al.,
2017). Through this approach we analyze the literature to distil what is known of the
multi-scalar policy processes in our four case study countries (Mali, Mozambique,
Malawi and Zimbabwe) and to identify how the policy processes panned out through
negotiations between actors at the following scale interactions:
● International–national interaction: the policy changes at the national level and how
these were related to the conditionalities of international funding agencies and the
broader socio-economic and political context. Structural adjustment and decentra-
lization programmes play a key role here.
● National–irrigation agency interaction: the processes of decentralization and how
these inﬂuenced the bureaucracy of the irrigation agencies. Here, we also look at
how irrigation agencies navigated and negotiated IMT policies in relation to O&M
practices, both before and after IMT policies were introduced.
● Irrigation agency–WUA interaction: the interactions, actors and factors that deter-
mined how IMT was implemented and received at the (local) irrigation scheme level.
IMT implementation in Mali, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe
Mali: the long and contested dismantling of the Oﬃce du Niger
In Mali the main focus of IMT was to decentralize some irrigation management tasks to
organized water users in the Oﬃce du Niger’s irrigation scheme, which is responsible for
irrigating 80,000 ha of land cultivated by smallholders, with an average plot size of
around 2 ha (Vandersypen et al., 2008). The process of transferring responsibilities was
managed in a top-down manner by the Oﬃce du Niger, a state agency with strong
political ties to the central government. In 1977 the Oﬃce du Niger proposed a project to
expand the irrigation scheme, which was supported by Mali’s president, who requested
ﬁnancial and technical aid from the World Bank. A follow-up diagnosis by the World
Bank and bilateral donors concluded that management reforms in the Oﬃce du Niger
were needed prior to expanding the scheme. Loans were conditional on these reforms,
which primarily included making irrigators active participants in scheme management,
reforming the rice marketing structures, breaking the agency’s monopoly over rice
commercialization and irrigation management, reducing O&M costs and improving
water delivery through ﬁeld and canal improvements (Aw & Diemer, 2005). The
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Malian government and the Oﬃce du Niger refused the reform package as threatening
their position and power. A stalemate with the donors was avoided in 1982 by negotiating
a pilot project to test a combination of technical and institutional improvements in one
secondary canal.
The pilot project signiﬁcantly increased yields and shifted some power from agency
staﬀ to the users (Aw & Diemer, 2005). Based on this success and the negotiation of small
reforms between 1984 and 1986, the Oﬃce du Niger and its personnel lost more power
over the irrigation scheme. Rice threshing and hulling was decentralized from the Oﬃce
du Niger through the introduction of new technologies, and rice markets (until then
controlled by the government) were liberalized. Rules giving farmers a licence to keep
using the same plot indeﬁnitely (including inheritance rights) increased land tenure
security. This reduced the Oﬃce du Niger’s power over farmers and settlers. Elected
farmers were included in decision making (though with limited powers) over how water
service fees were spent by the Oﬃce du Niger. These and other measures increased
farmers’ power in relation to agency staﬀ. In 1989, the World Bank signed the consolida-
tion loan, after the Malian government also acknowledged the need to reform the agency,
which had already lost much of its political power.
In 1991, a new government committed to liberalizing the economy and reforming the
Oﬃce du Niger. A reform unit under the prime minister’s oﬃce became responsible for
dealing with the Oﬃce du Niger employees’ union, farmers, ministries and donors. This
led to a downsizing of the agency’s staﬀ and the creation of new user-based institutions
with full control over the tertiary infrastructure and part of the secondary infrastructure
(Aw & Diemer, 2005; Vandersypen et al., 2006a). The reformed and greatly slimmed-
down Oﬃce du Niger kept responsibility for the main infrastructure and some of the
secondary infrastructure (Vandersypen et al., 2006b). In exchange, donors committed to
the rehabilitation of the scheme and at a later stage its expansion.
Later in the 1990s, the Oﬃce du Niger became responsible for facilitating WUAs’
organization, while farmers became more active in O&M of tertiary units. The organiza-
tion of farmers in WUAs was imposed on farmers in a top-down model through donor-
funded projects (Vandersypen, Verbist, Keita, Raes, & Jamin, 2009). The results for the
authority, legitimacy, capacity and functioning of the WUAs were mixed. Yet Aw and
Diemer (2005) argue that in terms of productivity, food production, democratization and
reduction of state expenditure in the irrigation sector, the reforms were successful.
In summary, the introduction of IMT in Mali was a long and contested political
process in which international donors, the national government, the Oﬃce du Niger
and local actors continuously negotiated their interests and positions. Embedded in a
much broader socio-economic and political context, the implementation of IMT only
came about after the Oﬃce du Niger had gradually lost its monopoly over land
distribution, water management and rice production and commercialization in the
irrigation scheme. This opened up space for local actors to engage in these processes
and activities and to gain political space at the local level. Simultaneously, the Oﬃce du
Niger lost its position in the national political arena, paving the way for reforms that
led to a new conﬁguration of irrigation management, in which organized local-level
water users have a much more important role, with the Oﬃce du Niger still controlling
the main and secondary canals.
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Mozambique: ambivalent transfer and re-control in the Chókwè irrigation system
The 26,000 ha Chókwè irrigation system played a central role in Mozambique’s IMT
process. In 1977, after independence and inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideals, the
Complexo Agro-Industrial de Limpopo was established in the area of the Chókwè
irrigation system to form the largest state farm in Mozambique. The Complexo was a
single state organization taking full control of all agricultural activities in the irrigation
system, with the exception of managing the canal system, which was put under the
control of an irrigation agency, the Sistema de Regadio Eduardo Mondlane. After several
reforms of the organization of production in the Chókwè irrigation system (Bowen, 1989;
Veldwisch, 2015), including the stepwise distribution of land to individual farmers, in
1997 the Sistema de Regadio Eduardo Mondlane was replaced by the Hidráulica de
Chókwè public company through a reform that included selling oﬀ old buildings,
reducing staﬀ numbers and devolving management responsibilities for IMT to newly
created WUAs. These WUAs (associações dos regantes) were established around hydrau-
lic units, mostly at the level of the secondary canal (distribuidor), typically covering 1000–
2000 ha each. They were made responsible for water distribution and maintenance of the
irrigation infrastructure from the secondary canals downwards. Hidráulica de Chókwè
remained responsible for maintenance of the primary infrastructure and the distribution
of water from it. Hidráulica de Chókwè’s attempt to dissolve the producers’ associations
was opposed by the farmers, who wanted the associations to become members of the new
WUAs rather than to be individual members (Pellizzoli, 2008). WUAs have had an
important role in coordinating rice production with Hidráulica de Chókwè and external
investors, as well as in land (re)allocations in some of the tertiary units (Veldwisch, 2015).
But Hidráulica de Chókwè still plays a central role in the whole process of irrigation
management and the coordination of production down to the tertiary level, making the
WUAs auxiliary bodies to Hidráulica de Chókwè, with little autonomy or decision-
making power over the O&M of the system. Our preliminary ﬁeldwork ﬁndings also
suggest that in the last few years Hidráulica de Chókwè has increasingly centralized
irrigation- and production-related responsibilities and power, raising question about the
eﬀect IMT policies have actually had on water users’ role in irrigation management.
Recapitulating, how the large-scale irrigation system of Chókwè is managed has been
closely related to the organization of agricultural production, which moved from indivi-
dual colonial settlers, via various models of socialist state farms, to mostly individual
farms. Though IMT was implemented in 1997 alongside the creation of Hidráulica de
Chókwè, the role of WUAs has remained marginal in O&M. Rather, they have come to
play a role in the coordination of production alongside Hidráulica de Chókwè; this
parastatal agency de facto manages irrigation O&M down to the tertiary canals, with a
very limited role for WUAs.
Malawi: formalization of an existing practice in smallholder irrigation schemes
In the absence of large-scale public irrigation systems in Malawi, and a small and
politically weak Department of Irrigation, the IMT policy mostly formalized an existing
practice of state disengagement from irrigation management. This led WUAs to be
caught in the ongoing struggle between local chiefs and the national government over
control of natural resources.
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During a period of large investments in public irrigation schemes, between 1967 and
1975, under the autocratic rule of President Banda, 16 public irrigation systems were
established, covering a total of 3,600 ha and varying in size between 20 and 505 ha
(Veldwisch, Bolding, & Wester, 2009). In the 1980s the government of Malawi had
heavy ﬁnancial constraints, caused by falling tobacco prices and increasing costs for
(fuel) imports. De facto management of various irrigation schemes was partially handed
over, even before an oﬃcial IMT policy existed (Veldwisch, Bolding, & Wester, 2009). The
ﬁnancial situation led the government to seek support from the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and other donors, who demanded the adoption of structural
adjustment programmes as a condition for support (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004). Under
pressure from the international donor community, the focus changed from constructing
new schemes to rehabilitating existing ones and combining this with farmer participation
and cost recovery. Scheme management committees were set up in the public irrigation
schemes (1989–94), following the institutional model for ‘self-help schemes’ developed
under donor-assisted programmes, with full smallholder participation in design and
construction.
In the ﬁnal years of President Banda’s rule, donor support waned, but with the move to
a more democratic system of government (from 1994 onwards) international donors re-
engaged with the development of numerous agricultural and irrigation policies in the
country (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004). Under the dominant policy discourse, ‘less state,
more market, more farmers’, irrigation-policy donors pushed for farmer management,
cost recovery and water pricing. In 2001 the new National Irrigation Policy and
Development Strategy was formally adopted, promoting full government withdrawal
from the public irrigation schemes and their transfer to the still-to-be-created WUAs
(Veldwisch et al., 2009). This did not prevent Japan from pressuring Malawi to maintain
ownership and control over the 800 ha Bwanje Valley Irrigation System, the construction
of which it was ﬁnancing, and which on completion in 2000 became the largest public
irrigation scheme in the country.
A series of donor-funded rehabilitation programmes were established, with the idea
that these should be completed before transfer to the farmers (Mulwafu & Nkhoma,
2002). The latest of these is the World Bank–funded Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and
Agricultural Development Project (2005–2014), under which four public schemes were
rehabilitated and formally handed over to WUAs (Posthumus, Baltissen, Mweninguwe,
Veldwisch, & Beekman, 2014).
Ferguson and Mulwafu (2007) made a detailed analysis of two schemes (Domasi and
Likangala) in southern Malawi, showing that the actual implementation of IMT policies
was inﬂuenced by local history and context, and occurred within the ﬁeld of authority
over natural resource management contested between the state and traditional autho-
rities. In Likangala the ‘transfer of authority’ was used by the state to ‘reassert its
authority’ by orchestrating the scheme management committee’s selection and training
through a local branch oﬃce of the Ministry of Agriculture (p. 221). By contrast, in
Domasi the process was used by local elites (in alliance with traditional authorities) to
strengthen informal land arrangements, including ‘renting and increased land concen-
tration’ (p. 225). Van Beusekom (2011) describes how the government subsequently
imposed new heads of the WUAs, some even from outside the local area, going against
locally elected traditional authorities. In the conﬂict that arose farmers boycotted WUA
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meetings and refused to accept WUA decisions on plot distribution for the diﬀerent
cropping seasons, because they did not recognize the WUA or its leaders as their
representatives.
In conclusion, what we see in Malawi is a cash-strapped government that accepted
decentralizing its administration and deregulating its economy under international
pressure for structural adjustment. This did not pose many challenges for the irrigation
agency, as it already practised a de facto hands-oﬀ policy on irrigation management. In
the implementation of the policy, scheme management committees and WUAs became
part of ongoing struggles for authority between local chiefs and the state, which was
further coloured by local farmers’ reluctance to take over irrigation management, as this
brought responsibilities and ﬁnancial obligations which they considered beyond their
capacity.
Zimbabwe: transfer ‘by default’ in smallholder irrigation schemes
In Zimbabwe the introduction of IMT was a gradual and rather dispersed process,
especially as the control and management of state agency–managed irrigation schemes
was institutionally dispersed. In 1980 the country opened up for international develop-
ment, aid agencies and NGOs, after the United Nations lifted the sanctions imposed on
Rhodesia. The International Monetary Fund, supported by the World Bank and the
African Development Bank, proposed turning over the smallholder irrigation schemes
managed by state agencies to the farmers in the early 1980s (Madyiwa & Zawe, 2012;
Zawe, Madyiwa, & Matete, 2015). In the years that followed, the smallholder irrigation
schemes in Zimbabwe beneﬁted from substantial investments from donor agencies. The
IMT process targeted this same sector, managed by the Department of Agriculture,
Technical and Extension Services, working in close collaboration with the Department
of Water Development and the Department of Rural Development, all of which operated
at the ministerial level (Zawe, 2006). However, these schemes represented only 5% (9,300
ha) of the total 172,000 irrigated hectares in 1999. At that time the lion’s share
(126,000 ha) was controlled and autonomously managed by large commercial farmers,
followed by parastatal estates (13,500 ha). In 1983, the Department of Rural Development
introduced irrigation management committees to help the state agency manage irrigation
projects. Zimbabwe’s economic structural adjustment programme, launched in 1990, was
meant to herald a new era of modernized, competitive, export-led agricultural indus-
trialization (Saunders, 1996). The programme led to a reduction of government sub-
sidies, which hit the smallholder irrigation sector, making it impossible for the
Department of Agriculture, Technical and Extension Services to sustain the O&M of
smallholder irrigation schemes. The Irrigation Division of the department started to
experiment with diﬀerent ways of transferring the management of irrigation schemes. In
some cases farmers were forced into joint irrigation management arrangements, and
trials were made of the commercialization of irrigation services through the Agricultural
Revolving Fund (Zawe, 2006). This period was characterized by a Janus-faced strategy in
which on the one side farmers and commercial service providers were introduced into
the O&M of irrigation schemes, while on the other side the state agencies tried to keep
control of O&M in smallholder irrigation schemes through the operation of the primary
infrastructure (Madyiwa & Zawe, 2012).
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In parallel, between 1990 and 1999, the Zimbabwean government, in coordination with
international support, was focused on developing new smallholder irrigation schemes and
handing them over to farmers through the built-own-operate-transfer system that was run
with farmer syndicates (Madyiwa & Zawe, 2012; Zawe, 2006). In 1998 a new Water Act,
which greatly leaned on donor-promoted water policies, was put in place. The act cen-
tralized water-related agencies and responsibilities under the newly created Zimbabwe
National Water Authority, operating under neoliberal principles (Kemerink-Seyoum et
al., 2017). But in the early 2000s the Zimbabwean government declared bankruptcy,
transferring irrigation management to farmers ‘by default’ (Bolding, 2004).
When the state agencies lost their operational capacity due to a lack of funds and
personnel, farmers were forced to manage, operate and maintain their own irrigation
systems. In the following years the country descended into mayhem as it transitioned to a
state-managed economy. Privately owned ‘white’ farms were invaded, redistributed and (in
2005) nationalized as part of the ‘Fast Track’ land redistribution to native African people
(Madyiwa & Zawe, 2012). In the political and economic turmoil, Zimbabwe’s National
Water Authority had little capacity to intervene in the irrigation sector, and international
agencies were kept at bay (Kemerink-Seyoum et al., 2017). As a result, smallholder farmers
(and those on redistributed irrigated lands) have had to use their ownmeans to operate and
manage their irrigation systems, with varying degrees of success.
Thus, after a long process in which irrigation agencies experimented with water users’
participation in irrigation management, IMT basically came about ‘by default’ after 2000.
Since 1980 international donors and development agencies, as well as the Department of
Agriculture, Technical and Extension Services, had worked on the construction and
rehabilitation of irrigation schemes and the development of users’ capacity/engagement
in O&M, but without turning over responsibility for the management of the main infra-
structure. The bankruptcy of the state in 2000 put an end to this, as state agencies became
unable to operate. Without state involvement in O&M farmers were forced to take over the
management of their systems, with very divergent results (Madyiwa & Zawe, 2012).
Analysis and conclusions
In this section we return to the central questions of this article: how the implementation
of internationally advocated IMT policies was diﬀerently shaped across three scales in
Mali, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and the relevant lessons for current policy
implementation in sub-Saharan Africa.
We have focused on understanding how IMT was shaped by the interplay between
international donor push, macro-economic dynamics, national policy making and the
interactions with (and nature of) irrigation infrastructure, bureaucracies and organized
users. Our analysis shows that the implementation of IMT changed form and meaning
according to the context in which they were implemented. This led to variegated
processes and outcomes that were all bundled under the shell of a common policy name.
By looking at how the diﬀerent IMT policies were implemented we try to explain
which factors and interactions inﬂuenced and shaped the policies across diﬀerent scales.
In doing so we focus on the main and most salient aspects of the cases, which necessarily
leaves out many details. Table 1 summarizes the main interactions at diﬀerent levels in
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Looking at the relations between international donors and national governments, it
becomes clear that in all four countries IMT was pushed, promoted and ﬁnanced by donors
in the water sector from the 1980s onwards. The long and phased processes that took place
in the decades that followed went hand in hand with high-level negotiations with sitting
governments as shifts occurred in national politics. These negotiations greatly determined
when and how international donors were able to push their agenda, through conditional
loans and targeted water reform programmes. These programmes were paired with budget-
ary cuts and (inter)nationally imposed economic restructuring. This shaped IMT in these
countries where donors, NGOs and governments invested little in increasing the irrigation
management capacity of WUAs, production capacity, commercialization or access to
inputs and technical support.
In some of these countries the interface between the national government and the
irrigation agency changed markedly. In Mali the Oﬃce du Niger greatly inﬂuenced how
IMT was rolled out. Its strong political clout at both the local and national level initially
held IMT at bay; the process was signiﬁcantly postponed and only gradually implemen-
ted by a new government after the Oﬃce du Niger lost its powerful political position.
However, because of the large scale (80,000 ha) and complexity of the irrigation scheme,
the agency remained in control of all primary and secondary canals. In Mozambique,
funder pressure led to the irrigation agency of the Chókwè irrigation system (26,000 ha)
being replaced by Hidráulica de Chókwè, which found strategies to maintain and regain
its power in both irrigation management and rice production, in the midst of reform.
In the countries with smaller agencies managing smallholders’ schemes (Malawi and
Zimbabwe), irrigation responsibilities were more dispersed institutionally, and farmer
engagement pre-dated these reforms (going back to the late 1970s and early 1980s). As a
result, open resistance to IMT from irrigation agencies was politically less signiﬁcant at
the national, regional and local levels. In most irrigation systems, O&M responsibilities
were delegated to WUAs without much technical or managerial support and training.
At the local level, the responses to IMT were context-speciﬁc and very divergent. In
Mali and Mozambique, WUA participation was organized for the tertiary and sometimes
secondary irrigation units, while in Zimbabwe and Malawi WUAs acquired more control
over the management of whole (albeit much smaller) formerly state-managed or co-
managed smallholder irrigation systems. In Mali some local leaders or chiefs were eager
to take over control over WUAs and irrigation management. In Mozambique the space
for user engagement in O&M was very limited, and non-existent above the tertiary units.
In Malawi and Zimbabwe smallholder irrigators were generally reluctant to take control
of their irrigation systems, due to their lack of capacity to assume O&M responsibilities.
In both countries there was a marked decline in the size of the irrigated areas, conﬁrming
that users could not cope with the challenges of irrigation management.
This seems to conﬁrm Shah et al.’s (2002) warning that IMT could not be simply
transferred to sub-Saharan countries, as well as Mollinga and Veldwisch’s (2016) obser-
vation that the size and technology of irrigation systems matters, and interacts with the
dynamics of national irrigation policies. Smaller, widely distributed public irrigation
systems were readily abandoned by less developed and centralized irrigation bureau-
cracies. Smallholder farmers in Malawi and Zimbabwe had great diﬃculty sustaining
these systems. In the countries with larger irrigation systems (Mali and Mozambique),
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state agencies navigated IMT while managing to keep the irrigation bureaucracy and
(parts of) the irrigation systems running with state/external support.
Our analysis of IMT policies across scales provides important insights on the inter-
relatedness of policy implementation at diﬀerent levels, i.e. the interplay between inter-
national donor push, macro-economic dynamics, national policy making and the
interactions with (and nature of) irrigation infrastructure, bureaucracies and organized
users. More detailed case-study-based anthropological insights on the interactions and
processes that take place between the actors and brokers who make such policies at
diﬀerent scales would make a meaningful contribution to better understanding policy
implementation and its impacts.
More than 20 years after the implementation of IMT in many sub-Saharan countries,
there are still many important questions about the eﬀects of these policies on the
smallholder irrigation sector. To better understand these, we suggest that special research
attention be given to:
● the new roles and modalities of operation that international donors, development
agencies, national governments and their agencies have developed to engage with,
and stimulate, the irrigation sector at diﬀerent scales in each country;
● the strategies smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted (individually
and collectively) to sustain working irrigation systems and agricultural production
within them (Woodhouse et al., 2017); and
● the eﬀects these developments have had on agrarian livelihoods and livelihood
strategies in diﬀerent contexts.
Such analysis can inform policy makers at diﬀerent scales about the strategies and
policies that contribute to the development of more inclusive agricultural development in
the irrigation sector of sub-Saharan African countries.
Notes
1. We do not aim to construct a complete overview of where, when and how IMT processes
were implemented in sub-Saharan Africa but focus on an in-depth analysis of these
processes in four diﬀerent national contexts.
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